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CHAPTER VIII  
 
PAUL STUBBS 
 
 
‘SOCIAL SECTOR’ OR THE DIMINUTION OF SOCIAL POLICY? 
REGULATING WELFARE REGIMES IN CONTEMPORARY BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter builds on existing work which is critical of international support and 
assistance policies in the sphere of the ‘social sector’ in B-H, a term popularised, in the 
world of external assistance projects, by the World Bank (WB), to refer to the wide range of 
institutional arrangements impacting upon livelihoods such as: health; education; 
employment and labour markets; and social assistance. The chapter will focus more 
narrowly, and from a somewhat different perspective, on ‘social policy’ and ‘welfare 
regimes’, arguing that external attempts to regulate welfare regimes in B-H have, by and 
large, been ill-conceived, belated, confusing, and contradictory, and have contributed to a 
diminution of the importance of social rights and of social policy as a whole, which has been 
given much less emphasis than it should have had, as a key pillar contributing to peace, 
security, good governance, and economic regeneration.  
Whilst critical of international support efforts, the concepts and terms which are 
central to the text - ‘social policy’ and ‘welfare regime’ - derive from recent work by the 
British Government’s Department for International Development (DFID), formerly the 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA). As early as 1995, ODA published work to 
explore the relationship between social policy and social development which utilised a very 
wide definition of social policy to refer to: 
“… any policy developed at supranational, state, local or community level which 
is underpinned by a social vision of society and which, when operationalised, 
affects the rights or abilities of citizens to meet their livelihood needs” (ODA, 
1995; 26). 
 
Conceived in this way, the relationships between supranational, regional, state, sub-
state, and local bodies, are framed in terms of competing or concordant social visions. This 
is especially important in B-H where the essence of the war, so-called ‘ethnic cleansing', 
must be seen as a particularly obnoxious social vision and, therefore, a kind of social policy. 
Indeed, the relative neglect of formal social policy within the Dayton General Framework 
Agreement for Peace (GFAP), with its failure to vest any real operational possibilities in a 
central state, has produced a consequent increase in the role and significance of bodies 
and groups above the level of the state, including diverse international and supra-national 
organisations, and below it, including actors in local communities.    
The notion of a ‘welfare regime’, increasingly influential in social policy studies, has 
also been utilised in recent planning for DFID programs in B-H, and refers to: 
“the interdependent way in which welfare is produced and allocated between 
the state, market, civil society and the family” (DFID, 2000).  
 
Hence, by adding this, we are concerned with another set of relationships within a 
nation state which, of course, can be combined in different ways, implying different visions 
of social policy, all of which are also likely to be seen differently by different actors. In many 
ways, recent attempts to influence the governance and the content of B-H’s welfare regimes 
(in the plural since there are, certainly, two and, as we shall note below, possibly three such 
systems at the moment), can be seen as based on a misreading of inherited, pre-war, 
structures and processes as if they were, essentially, the same as those in Soviet-controlled 
Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the complexities of the ‘Yugoslav exception’, 
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addressed in Section 2 of this chapter, suggest that seeing the domain of ‘the social’ as, in 
and of itself, inhibiting of 'economic progress’ and ‘political freedoms’, is too simplistic and in 
danger of leading to the imposition of a narrow, neo-liberal, ‘template’ model of adjustment 
and reform.   
To multiply the complexity even more, these relationships all occur within the 
framework of another set of relationships: those between macro-level social structures and 
micro-level social processes, themselves changing rapidly, and perhaps far more fluid and 
flexible than ever before, in the context of new forms of ‘globalisation', perhaps most 
succinctly defined as:  
“a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural 
arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they 
are receding” (Waters, 1995; 3).  
 
This is extraordinarily important for a number of reasons, not least in terms of the 
dissolution of old categorisations and the transgression of traditional boundaries. In this 
context, it has to be stated that those who study social policy are highly likely to be 
personally and professionally involved in the processes they study. In what might be termed 
the 'privatisation’ of policy advice, there is an increasing role for the freelance academic-
researcher-consultant, called in by a range of international agencies, but particularly the 
WB, the UN agencies, and major bilateral donors, to offer ‘advice' in preparing and 
developing projects and programs; evaluating them; and sometimes even implementing and 
running them. The implications of this go far beyond this study, or the other studies in this 
critical assessment of international assistance in B-H, and merit much more analysis, 
discussion and debate.   
However, one issue is directly relevant and should be stated at the outset. If this 
shift is real, then there is no longer any possibility of true ‘objective’, ‘impartial’ and ‘neutral’ 
research.  Conflicts of interest are, rather, endemic in any writing about social policy in B-H 
since those who write are, inevitably, either already involved, or soon will be, in the 
development of policy advice and program implementation, often both. Indeed, access to 
key actors and policy documentation is increasingly only available through involvement in a 
consultancy for a donor, advice or implementing agency, which itself requires certain kinds 
of confidentiality. Hence, the ability to detail what one finds in the course of that consultancy 
for the sake of wider research and the furtherance of knowledge is limited. In addition, there 
is the self-imposed censorship of not wanting to risk being seen as ‘unreliable’ and 
‘unethical’ – especially pronounced for those who do not have permanent, well-paid, 
academic/research positions (which includes, I would assert, all researchers and scholars 
from, and currently working in, B-H), and who therefore rely, to a greater or lesser extent, on 
such consultancies for their own livelihoods. This, as much else in wider global social 
relations, requires new forms of ethics, accountability and trust, and new forms of writing 
which acknowledge the conflicts of interest and seek to steer a path between the Scylla and 
Charybidis of dry objectivism, on the one hand, and trivialised anecdotalism, on the other.  
This chapter treats these three sets of relations chronologically, beginning with the 
pre-war welfare regime in B-H as a part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY). Section 3 focuses on the welfare regime during war and the coincidence of the war 
in B-H with a greatly increased role of particular kinds of International Non-Governmental 
Organisations (INGOs), which was, itself, reinforced by this coincidence. Section 4 
addresses the manifest and manifold problems of the GFAP for any state-based reciprocal 
social policy in B-H. Section 5 focuses specifically on the role of the World Bank in the 
reform process in relation to social policy, in the context of wider developments in global 
governance, and Section 6 looks at some innovative bilateral programs with which two 
members of the current study team (Papic and Stubbs) have been involved in key roles. 
Section 7 draws some conclusions and makes some recommendations.    
 
 
2. The Welfare Regime in Pre-1992 B-H 
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In the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the welfare regime after 
the ‘break with Stalin’ in 1948 was different from those found in other state socialist 
societies in Central and Eastern Europe which remained within the Soviet sphere of 
influence. After an initial, proto-Stalinist, faith in centralised planning, rapid urbanisation, 
and mass literacy campaigns, there was an increasing recognition, from the late 1950s, of 
the inability of central planning to meet all needs and to eliminate poverty and social 
problems. Through a series of reforms in the late 1960s and early 1970s, often with the 
assistance of the IMF and WB, a system of social policy provision emerged which was seen 
as both ‘very highly developed’, and combining ‘development with decentralisation’ (World 
Bank, 1975). In former Yugoslavia, unlike most of South Eastern Europe, there was a 
recognition, from the late 1950s, of the need for professional social work interventions to 
combat social problems, based on an understanding that socialist economic progress was 
not, in itself, enough. This led to the formation of Centres for Social Work in most urban 
Municipalities in the early 1960s, with university level social work training beginning even 
before this in Belgrade, Ljubljana and Zagreb.  
In the context of the 1974 Constitution, which gave the Republics many of the 
powers of states, the importance of the ‘social’ dimension of economic policy was 
particularly important in B-H, both because of its relatively underdeveloped status, and as a 
result of it being a mixed Republic in which Muslims, newly recognised as a constituent 
people, were the largest single national/ethnic group. The emergent ‘welfare regime’, then, 
can be seen as a combination of workplace welfare; traditional family care; limited universal 
social rights; professionalism social protection; and, to an extent, voluntary and religious 
based charitable effort. Missing from this was any real notion of community-based 
approaches to welfare, despite the centrality of socialist self-management within the post-
1974 settlement. This can be understood as a product of: the internal contradictions of self-
management, coupled with the power of traditional careers and new professionals, both of 
which operated within somewhat paternalistic, pathologising, and patronising approaches; 
and in the context of the critical absence of a vibrant civil society and alternative political 
culture (unlike that developing, at the time, in Ljubljana, Belgrade, and Zagreb, for 
example).   
In this regard, the lack of a four-year graduate program in social work at the 
University of Sarajevo, so that most of the new social work professionals were trained, at 
least for some of the time, in one of the other Republics, in the context of a rapid expansion 
of higher education, particularly for Muslims, within B-H, is also important. An emergent 
professional social space, then, retained an intimate connection to the wider social, political, 
and cultural tensions within B-H and SFRY as a whole. Hence, in the economic and political 
crises of the 1980s which were particularly dramatic in B-H, and sometimes led to the 
impoverishment of whole communities, as in Velika Kladusa with the collapse of 
Agrokomerc, there was no real lead taken by social workers in developing an alternative 
analysis and practice. Social work remained a conservative profession in a conservative 
Republic. Indeed, the roots of ‘clientelism', in terms of the inter-relationship between 
personalised political, economic and social connections, can be traced back to this period. 
This ‘clientelism’ was to become amplified during the war and in the post-war period.   
This very brief, and oversimplified, discussion is relevant for three inter-linked 
reasons. Firstly, because in the rapid rush of reform efforts in the aftermath of the GFAP, 
few international agencies, their staff, or key definers, made any real effort to understand 
these details. Secondly, insofar as they did address the pre-1991 welfare regime, it was in 
terms of a caricature of socialist planning in which people ‘expected’ and ‘waited for’ social 
protection from the state, which was erroneous. And, thirdly, because external reforms 
tended to fail to note the importance of deep seated memories of welfare, not all of which 
were negative, among populations of service users and, above all, social workers and 
related professionals, who continued to act according to existing values, attitudes, and 
assumptions.   
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Whilst it is relatively easy, in the aftermath of a very bloody and destructive war, to 
dismantle certain institutional structures, the memories, and cultural values placed upon 
those structures, felt not as separable (and therefore reformable) forms, but usually 
experienced as a whole, are much more resistant to change. Importantly, the notion that 
‘the state will provide’ was not the central plank of the system. Nevertheless, the ‘mix’ of full 
employment, guaranteed incomes, and a faith in a ‘patchwork’ of formal and informal care, 
including family care, charitable assistance, moonlighting by professionals, and networking 
through ‘connections’, was powerful and relatively secure. The study of reform efforts, 
therefore, ceases to be fully understandable in terms of the dry analysis of institutional 
change but must encompass historical memory, cultural patterns, and a micro-sociology or, 
indeed, anthropology of change encounters between in-country and external subjects. The 
need to be active and creative in utilising or manipulating these ‘connections’, so that, 
eventually, ‘someone will look after us’, is crucial. In a sense, the ‘international community’ 
simply added another layer of complexity and possibility. This is a more accurate portrayal 
of the realities of assistance in the war and post-war period, in fact, than the usual notion 
that the paternalistic state was replaced by paternalistic humanitarian aid, thereby 
encouraging ‘dependency’.   
 
 
3. The Welfare Regime in War, 1992-1995: Humanitarian Aid, International NGOs and 
Implicit Social Policy 
 
The significance of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a ‘new war' in ‘new times’ 
needs constantly re-stating, since it frames many of the interventions of a range of new 
actors in which strategic disengagement, in terms of wider geo-politics, combines with the 
substitution of humanitarian aid for external political will (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2000; 102). 
However, as a war in Europe, moreover ‘the first war to which one can hitch-hike from 
Amsterdam’, the disengagement which Bojicic-Dzelilovic refers to was, actually, never 
complete but rather filtered through a multiplication and diversification of international 
actors, particularly various kinds of International NGOs (INGOs). In terms of the legacy for 
the social sector and the welfare regime, the ways in which the provision of humanitarian 
aid set the contours of a new implicit social policy is particularly important. Large numbers of 
INGOs, already concentrated in Croatia as a result of the war which began there in 1991, 
were to become the main vehicles for international assistance for the first time, so that the 
war in B-H was coincident with the increasing importance of INGOs, transformed from 
agents of global civil society and advocacy to essentially ‘private aid agencies’ (Biekhart 
1999), delivering ‘projects’ and ‘programs’, largely externally designed and funded but 
which, in their implementation, sometimes used and always transformed, local structures, 
resources, and meanings.   
The ‘negotiated access’ for the delivery of essential aid (shelter, food and non-food 
items) was particularly important in terms of its reliance on, and thereby reinforcement of, 
clientelism or what, elsewhere, has been termed a ‘new feudalism’ (Deacon and Stubbs, 
1998), in which a state is broken down into ever smaller, relatively autonomous, bounded 
entities. In fact, the ability to control the movement of goods, people and services, through 
control of particular routes and territories, became a central element of the war, 
unchallenged until very late in the day by external force. Access to different parts of the 
country was, of course, ‘uneven’ as a result of both internal and external factors, and aid 
was increasingly ‘targeted’ to particular groups of the population, both tendencies also 
reinforcing and increasing the arbitrariness and localisation of survival and livelihood 
conditionalities. The development of war economies, beginning to be addressed in recent 
literature, should not blind us to the development and significance of war welfare regimes, 
which also remain important in later restructuring in the post-war context.  
Through their large-scale relief programs, the European Union (through ECHO its 
new humanitarian arm), the United Nations agencies, primarily through UNHCR as ‘lead 
agency’, USAID and other bilaterals, tended not to implement projects directly but to work 
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through ‘implementing partners’, initially INGOs such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS), the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and many others so that, by the end of 
the war, over 200 INGOs were registered as working in B-H. These agencies, increasingly 
‘multi-mandated’ (Duffield, 1996) and multi-funded, worked on an ‘external’ model of 
assistance. Hence, their key staff were experienced aid workers from crises in developing 
countries, where models of rights-based social welfare were much less important, reinforced 
by newly recruited international staff with some volunteer experience in the region, and only 
in third place was there a priority on the recruitment of ‘local staff’, most often expected to 
accept and comply with these frameworks and models rather than adapt and reform them. 
Given that employment by an international agency, for those who remained in B-H, was 
itself a crucial survival and livelihood opportunity, providing salaries far in excess of any 
other similar employment, any resistance to this subordinated role was always likely to be 
informal and unsystematic, if it was present at all. Rarely did any of these groups, 
separately or together, seek to assess or build upon the capacities of existing institutional 
structures.    
The tendency of existing Bosnian professionals, including those in Centres for Social 
Work (CSWs), to join international agencies, did occur but was itself complex since 
agencies tended to prefer younger staff, those who spoke English, and those seen as able 
to adapt to rapidly changing conditions. Sometimes, those with professional qualifications in 
social work were marginalized vis-à-vis other professions, particularly psychologists, and 
younger graduates from other, non-related disciplines, more willing and able to utilise the 
terminology and technology of external international interventionism. In some ways, this can 
be seen as reinforcing the conservatism of CSWs and other welfare providers, including the 
local Red Cross branches, whose role rarely challenged ‘ethnic cleansing’ and sometimes, 
even in the case of the latter, reinforced it (the wife of extreme nationalist Radovan 
Karadzic became President of the Red Cross in the Serbian territory, retaining this position 
in Republika Srpska for a time even after the Dayton Agreement). Very quickly, then, 
mistrust became an intrinsic element of a new diversified welfare regime - fragmented and 
localised, residualised, category-based rather than needs-based, and de-politicised.   
Centres for Social Work were not, of course, completely ignored in these processes, 
but, deprived of some of their more innovative staff, they became little more than conduits 
for international assistance, compiling beneficiary lists, often alongside other agencies. No-
one thought of investing in CSWs in terms of technologies which would have enabled them 
to play a greater role in the welfare regime of the time (in contrast every INGO and many of 
their local counterparts received massive injections of computer, communications and 
transport resources). Most parts of B-H where international agencies worked, established 
aid co-ordination mechanisms but these rarely included CSWs or, indeed, any local 
institutions, being entirely composed of international agencies, although often themselves 
represented by local staff.   
One initiative which was a partial exception to these processes was the REACH 
program implemented by CARE and funded by a range of agencies including ECHO, DFID, 
and CIDA, which began towards the end of the war (Shenstone 1998). Through a focus on 
‘exceptionally vulnerable individuals’ (EVIs in the international development lexicon), the 
program can be seen to have reinforced residual approaches to welfare since it continued 
to think in terms of categories: the elderly; ethnic minorities; refugees; and so forth, rather 
than to articulate any more sophisticated rights-based approach. Nevertheless, it was one 
of the first programs to seek to have an all-Bosnia focus, as opposed to being localised in 
one particular area, and it did base its interventions on existing structures, in part at least, 
including CSWs and health clinics, seeking to reform existing practices through the 
development of ‘home care’ assessment and intervention teams.   
CARE was, together with CRS and IRC, a major implementer of a range of programs 
in B-H and, through its own complex multi-national structure, CARE Canada was the lead 
CARE agency, establishing itself as CARE B-H and Croatia. Utilising Canadian expertise, 
the program can be seen as a hybrid of Western European and United States models of 
welfare. Even more importantly, CARE's then head of office was increasingly concerned 
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with the wider challenge of ‘transition programming’ in terms of how to rethink the structures 
of assistance after the war, both in terms of the development of civil society (commissioning 
a highly influential report by Ian Smillie (1996)) and in terms of social policy, pushing donors 
to address the question of ‘turning over’ international assistance programs to local 
organisations. This concern can, in retrospect, be seen as both intellectually driven and 
opportunistic – insofar as those agencies who had faced these issues most effectively were 
likely to be best placed to capitalise on the shift in donor priorities from relief to 
development. The intellectual basis of this, whilst actively seeking academics and 
researchers with whom to dialogue, continued to ignore local intellectual expertise. Hence, 
this one initiative which was in advance of all others at the time, itself reproduced many of 
the problems of creating an implicit social policy through diverse welfare regimes.   
The implications of the problematic transition from ‘relief’ to ‘development’ was 
particularly pronounced, therefore, in B-H in the transition from war to peace. Relief had 
been dominated not by wider social policy concerns but by keeping people alive long 
enough for a peace agreement to materialise, as if the two processes were completely 
separable. In addition, relief agencies, in particular the new strengthened INGOs/private aid 
agencies, sought themselves to be conduits for later development assistance – building civil 
society, post-war reconstruction, and internal institutional capacity building. The complete 
separation between human rights and solidarity-based approaches, including those funded 
by innovative agencies such as the Open Society Institute, on the one hand, and the 
implementing partner and service delivery model, on the other, also posed immense 
problems, since agencies concerned with social welfare tended not to utilise any kind of 
rights-based frameworks and could offer no challenge to the dominant, modernist, Western 
model which the former reinforced, of individualised notions of human rights alongside neo-
liberal distrust of ‘the social sphere’ per se. Even more importantly, diversity in the welfare 
regime had developed completely accidentally and anarchically and not as a result of any 
principles. INGOs, in turn both ‘over-ethnicising’ and ‘de-ethnicising’ in their social practices, 
tended to misunderstand, misread, and marginalize CSWs which, denied of resources, both 
human and material, tended to become vehicles for social exclusion and discrimination 
whereas, had more accurate analyses and attempts at alliances been made, could have 
become forces for re-integration and even a core ‘peace constituency’.   
 
 
4. Solidifying Ethnicity and Ethnicising Solidarities: The Welfare Regime and the 1995 
Dayton Agreement 
  
The Dayton Agreement or GFAP has been criticised, rightly, from a number of 
diverse perspectives but, mainly because, whilst valid as a (short-term) peace agreement it 
has much less validity and credibility as a long-term constitutional agreement since it 
reinforces and legitimises ‘ethnic cleansing’ and, indeed, allows the parties to the conflict to 
pursue ‘war by other means’ (Woodward, 1996). There has been very little commentary, 
however, on the fact that the draftees of the GFAP, whilst obviously not seeing social 
policy, in any sense, as a priority, established the ground-rules for welfare governance in 
B-H which, more than five years later, continue to limit effective, efficient, and equitable 
reform efforts. In a sense, the structures laid down were ‘the worst possible’ and, given the 
failure to address social policy and social welfare in its entirety, it would actually have been 
preferable if the GFAP had established no ground rules for the constitution of the new post-
war welfare regimes in B-H.   
Under the Constitution agreed at Dayton, no social policy responsibilities are 
allocated to the overall State institutions. Article III (3) states explicitly that 'all government 
functions and responsibilities which are not strictly given to the institutions of Bosnia-
Herzegovina shall be the functions and responsibilities of an entity'. Hence, the agreement 
allows for the development of two distinct social policies and social welfare regimes within 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Federation and in Republika Srpska. The existence of the illegal 
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Herceg-Bosna para-state entity effectively holds out the possibility for the emergence of 
three social policies and three welfare regimes, each of which receive support from 
neighbouring states, some of which are themselves guarantors of the GFAP, most 
particularly Croatia in terms of Herceg-Bosna, and Serbia in terms of Republika Srpska. 
Indeed, within the Federation social policy powers are further divided between the 
Federation and the Cantons. The Federation, under Article 1, has exclusive responsibility 
for the creation of monetary and fiscal policy. Health issues and social welfare policy are 
defined as joint responsibilities of the Federation and Cantons under Article 2 (III). Cantons 
are given responsibility by Article 4 for the creation and regulation of education policy, the 
creation and regulation of housing policy, the creation and regulation of policy regarding 
public services, and for the implementation of social policy and maintenance of social 
welfare services.  
In essence then, the GFAP creates a contradiction between entity-based rights and 
the need for lower levels of the system, Cantons and Municipalities in FB-H, and 
Municipalities alone in RS, to raise resources to meet these rights. The system, therefore, 
promotes the creation of high levels of unrealisable social rights, completely disconnected 
from revenue questions. Indeed, as Cantons and Municipalities vary enormously in size, 
resources, and revenue-raising abilities, fundamental inequities in the realisation of rights 
and entitlements are also built into the system and its structure. This is illustrated, indeed, 
by the fact that the Federal Law on Social Protection passed in July 1999 required Cantons 
to pass laws with the same, or greater rights than the Federal law, within three months. 
Given the need for Cantons to match rights with available resources, it is not surprising that 
four Cantons still have not done so.  In RS, the system remains based on a 1993 law, 
amended in 1996, and accompanied by a series of legislative acts, but which also leaves 
intact a system where rights outweigh resources.  In RS, child protection and child benefit 
payments are underpinned by a Children’s Fund, which does promote a sharing of risk 
across the entity.  In addition, a Solidarity Fund is meant to equal resources available to 
vulnerable groups but, thus far, has been used mainly to finance pensions and veterans’ 
programs, rather than for social assistance. 
Hence, with this variation in the size, resources, and revenue-raising abilities of the 
Cantons and Municipalities, fundamental inequities in the realisation of rights and 
entitlements are also built into the system and its structure. In addition, mainstream social 
policy responsibilities in both RS and FB-H are, largely, vested in marginalized sections of 
marginalized Ministries. In RS, it is the responsibility of an Assistant Minister within the 
health-dominated Ministry of Health and Social Protection, and in FB-H responsibility lies 
with an Assistant Minister within the Ministry of Refugees and Social Policy.    
Perhaps most importantly, the GFAP ended any hope of a ‘normal’ social policy in a 
‘normal’ state, based on an assumption of reciprocity and sharing of risk in which all citizens 
have a responsibility for raising revenues which are then disbursed, on the basis of need. 
Instead, separate ethnicized claims and loyalties are legitimated, leading to three separate 
welfare regimes underpinned by a social vision which limits reciprocal obligations on the 
basis of ethnicized belonging. In a sense then, sub-state entities and CSWs become 
responsible for the administration of a particularly narrow set of benefits, primarily for 
majority communities, with local and international NGOs, focused on minorities, refugees 
and displaced persons, and minority returnees. Hence, ethnicization is itself embedded in 
the new ‘welfare mix’ in B-H, most pronounced in RS where Merhamet for Bosniacs, and 
Caritas for Croats, play the role of ethnicized CSWs for minorities.   
Rather than witnessing a process of democratisation, pluralism and a move towards 
a well-regulated, open, market economy, it is probably more accurate and useful to see 
contemporary B-H as a 'virtual' or 'neo-feudal' state in which power is concentrated locally, 
in mini-states, based on patronage, influence peddling, and mafia-like elites. Social welfare 
regimes reflect these tendencies and reinforce them. International agencies, including those 
charged with regulation, implementation, and institutional development, have been 
extremely reluctant to recognise this, consistently misreading the situation, at least for 
public consumption, in which the GFAP must be accepted in toto, in terms of the GFAP 
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promoting a ‘normal’, ‘modern’ priority given to ‘decentralised’ social welfare regimes based 
on ‘subsidiarity’.  
In fact, it is not quite the whole story to suggest that international agencies have 
sought to render complex political questions as essentially 'technical' in B-H. There have 
been major distortions in the levels of support for different parts of B-H which are unrelated 
to need but are, in fact, related to an ambiguous sense of the legitimacy of Republika 
Srspka which, until almost two years after the GFAP, received a far smaller proportion of 
international assistance.  It is very difficult to assess the diverse impact of different kinds of 
transfer payments, remittances from abroad, support from sympathetic states, and such 
like, but the decentralisation and diversification of these transfers have also reinforced 
ethnicized claims. In addition, the importance of new hierarchies of provision, notably in 
terms of categorisations of ‘war victims’, have further complicated the picture.  
 
In the initial post-GFAP period, we can see social policy in B-H as a relatively under-
developed theme, for a number of reasons, including:        
1.  That relief interventions have tended to operate through INGOs or local NGOs, 
often sub-contracted to provide services, thus forming a parallel system with little 
integration or functional relationship with public services. 
2.  That those grassroots initiatives which have been more independent and less 
oriented to service delivery have been much more concerned with expanding the 
civil space and human rights rather than the social space and social rights. 
3.  That a range of social service initiatives have tended to be project based and 
focused on client groups: children; people with disabilities; older people; and so on, 
rather than to be concerned with the broader functioning of the system.  
4.  That no supranational agency has social policy as its main focus in B-H and the 
efforts of the lead agencies have been much more oriented to frameworks of 
governance, human rights, economic development, reconstruction and return.  
 
It is this last issue that we focus on in the next section, seeking to account for and 
critique the increasing emphasis on formal social policy questions from mid-1997 onwards 
by the World Bank and others.   
 
 
5. Changing Bosnia or Changing the Bank?: New Global Governance and Social 
Policy Reform 1997-1999   
 
Major supranational and global agencies, including the World Bank (WB), have 
been instrumental in shaping the social policy choices made in post-communist Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since 1989 (Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs, 
1997).  The task has been relatively straightforward once such organisations have been 
able to identify Ministerial counterparts with whom to do business.  In the process of the 
encounter with countries which have a legacy of social development and social rights 
which exceed levels of economic development, the Bank has also been changed, too, and, 
whilst still dominating the reform process, together with the IMF, has had to accommodate 
much more of an emphasis on the social costs of transition, or the need for ‘transition with 
a human face’.   
As ever, the situation of the WB’s engagement with B-H has been different, not 
least because of the GFAP which means that there is a need to ‘do business’ with far more 
counterparts, at entity and, indeed, in FB-H, Cantonal levels. A model of co-ordinated 
assistance strategies in which post-GFAP B-H is the subject of a ‘new Marshall Plan’ has 
proved highly elusive, not least because of the complex governance arrangements in B-H, 
the decline in importance of UN agencies, the multiplicity of donor efforts and, indeed, 
donor fatigue as other emergencies grabbed the headlines. Whilst a case study of the 
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WB’s role in social sectors is beyond the scope of this text, some impressions from key 
moments are relevant.   
Whilst its own evaluation of its programs suggests that “The Bank's response to 
post-conflict needs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was early and comprehensive” (World Bank 
OED, 2000; 11), in the sphere of social policy and welfare regimes it was neither.  Of the 
sixteen ‘emergency projects’ initiated between February and December 1996, only one part 
of one of them – an Emergency Social Fund to provide incomes to the poorest households 
in 1996, only in FB-H, was concerned with social policy (ibid; 35-38). Even this was seen to 
have been based on payments which were “too widely dispersed and not sufficiently 
means tested” (ibid; 62). In fact, the payments system utilised CSWs so that, in fact, the 
problems of the scheme were less to do with targeting than with a lack of sustainability, 
with no plans for how to continue the scheme once donations dried up.  
In May 1997, almost eighteen months after the GFAP was signed, the World Bank 
Resident Mission convened a Social Assistance Strategy Meeting, attended by the Ministry 
of Refugees and Social Policy in FB-H, and about twenty INGOs and donor agencies, 
together with the Bank, in Sarajevo. The minutes of the meeting state that: 
“... a serious attempt is missing to help the government develop a strategy for a 
streamlined and affordable program of social benefits beyond the emergency 
phase, and in particular there is: (i) lack of a framework ...within which to 
develop the part of the social safety net that it will be essential to maintain once 
donors begin to phase out; (ii) significant ambiguity over the future content and 
coverage of social welfare programs; (iii) lack of clarity regarding the role and 
responsibilities of government and non-government organisations as providers 
of social services; and (iv) no financing plan to ensure the sustainability of social 
services once donor funds dry up.” (World Bank 1997). 
   
As an indictment of social policy reform effort, the minutes are clear and indicate 
the beginnings of concern by the Bank to see this as important, although the confusion is 
compounded by reference to ‘the government’ when it should read ‘governments’, and the 
continued foreign domination of the process with INGOs beginning to develop a rhetoric of 
‘capacity building’ as a sure way of retaining a place in the system. Indeed, already by this 
point, Save the Children (UK) had established advisor positions in the relevant parts of the 
Ministries of FB-H, RS, and Tuzla Canton, a move which was, in retrospect, far too early 
and based on inappropriate notions of ‘importing’ Western models and approaches, as was 
a UNICEF/University of Stockholm initiative which utilised crude ‘psycho-social approaches’ 
unsuited to Bosnian realities. Other agencies continued to simply establish parallel 
institutions, the best, or perhaps worst, example of which is the example of Norwegian 
People’s Aid in Zenica which, because of problems in their negotiations with an existing 
children’s institution, simply built another one, with better facilities and salaries and, 
certainly, a different model of care, 100 meters down the road. Now, of course, Zenica’s 
two institutions need to be ‘sustainable’ and to be funded by the Municipality!   
In the months after the World Bank meeting, the initiative for taking reform forward 
was given to CARE which had responsibility for organising an ECHO-funded conference 
which was held in December 1997 and subsequently published (Stubbs and Gregson eds, 
1998). CARE devoted one member of staff to the organising of the conference, working 
with the author of this chapter (Stubbs). In retrospect, working with CARE provided an 
opportunity to break out of the policy vacuum in this area and to force supranational agencies, 
particularly the World Bank, to recognise the existence of in-country competence in social 
policy.  However, it also illustrated the ad hoc, almost accidental, nature of the policy debate 
and, more importantly, of the question of which agencies would be centrally involved. By 
contributing small amounts of funding, both the World Bank and the International Federation of 
the Red Cross ensured themselves a stake in the conference format and in shaping future work 
whereas UNDP, for example, had no such role, simply because they had not offered funding 
rather than for any ideological reason. Moreover, once the conference was judged a success, 
the CARE staff member was seconded to the World Bank to establish a Social Policy Task 
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Force, funded by the same agencies plus the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA). The Task Force despite, or perhaps because of, its strong local representation and 
ownership, has never really become a conduit for steering, planning and co-ordinating external 
social policy assistance. The fact that social policy questions are still not a priority of donors has 
to be set in the context of the low priorities that such questions are given within Governments in 
B-H, also.  
The absence of a clear external lead agency in social policy reform, able to link with 
powerful Ministries, is very apparent. The World Bank has tended to work at arms length on a 
range of issues, although recent consultation processes on structural adjustment loans have 
been more focused on conditionalities in the social sector and a new Social Sector Technical 
Assistance Credit (SOTAC) does show that the Bank is in tune with some current thinking, 
although the linking of social policy with labour market issues remains problematic. The Office 
of the High Representative (OHR) has made occasional forays into the field, as in the mention 
of social protection at the Madrid Peace Implementation Council Meeting in December 1998 
but, again, seconding foreign experts for one year who combine a wish to do good with a steep 
learning curve, is hardly an effective way to make policy. In any case, OHR remains more 
focused on modelling return scenarios and has a staff with little commitment to European 
approaches to social rights. The European Union, whose development programs were delayed 
whilst ECHO continued to operate within an emergency framework highly suspicious of any 
governmental structures, remains ill-focused, bureaucratic, and extraordinarily time-consuming 
in terms of delays from assessment to dispersal of grants and implementation of programs.  In 
addition, in its latter phase, ECHO also supported a number of INGOs to build the capacity of 
CSWs which, after years of neglect, simply saw this as an opportunity to receive some funds 
and/or judged the interventions as misguided and further erosive of what little trust remained 
within the sector.   
What is particularly important is that all of the projects noted above were designed by 
external consultants with little direct, meaningful, initial involvement of Bosnia scholars, 
consultants or practitioners.  Later, of course, in the process of ‘building capacity’, a very small 
core group of the same local experts have been engaged by each and every program, in 
somewhat different ways, and according to different assumptions, external frameworks and 
models. This is extraordinarily disempowering of internal expertise and, perhaps, one of the 
major lessons which needs to be learnt.   
The issue of the role of the World Bank within the broader configuration of the Stability 
Pact also needs to be noted here. The Working Table on Economic Restructuring, 
Development and Co-operation appears unduly influenced by macro-economic 
considerations based on an agenda produced by the World Bank. This risks aggravating 
the conditions of vulnerable people in the region by urging too great a haste in reform, 
including budgetary restrictions, removal of subsidies, and rapid enterprise restructuring 
and trade liberalisation, and it suggests a very restricted notion of social rights in terms of 
welfare safety nets (World Bank, 2000). The Bank may be more able to emphasise 
economic growth per se, as opposed to pro-poor growth, in a region where there is greater 
instability and insecurity as evidenced by a quote from a senior Bank official at the 
conference held in Sarajevo in December 1997 who stated that “the extent to which the old 
system has been destroyed might provide a unique opportunity for fundamental reform” 
(World Bank, 1998). The need for much greater accountability and transparency in the 
operations of the World Bank and IMF are clear – saccharine-flavoured internal case study 
reports are not enough, but, again, the difficulty of developing a critical perspective when, 
often, the Bank can buy its way in to key academic and research structures is a real 
problem.   
 
 
6. New Approaches: Towards Welfare Governance?  
 
One initiative supported by the Government of Finland, and implemented by UNDP and 
the Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI), following a programme planning 
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mission of which the author was a member, sought to initiate a fundamental shift in social policy 
programming in B-H, towards a greater focus on regulating and reforming the governance of 
welfare regimes. The nature of this programme and a proposed initiative by the British 
Government Department for International development (DFID) are of interest, both in terms of 
the new directions they open up, but also the continued need for ‘personal influence’ and the 
almost accidental nature of social policy making, and the problems of the balance of power in 
new project specific approaches.  
The Government of Finland expressed its intention to fund a project in the social sector 
in B-H as early as July 1997, with an initial assessment mission in B-H in November-December 
1997. The multiplicity of links and influences between the current author, with a research base 
in Finland, and key personnel in IBHI and UNDP, led to successful lobbying in favour of 
including Travnik as well as Prijedor in the programme, and to a focus on reform of social 
protection based on work already undertaken by IBHI which was far more concerned with 
governance and new forms of partnerships, thus: 
"Centres for Social Work must become a basic segment of the institutional 
network, with NGOs and other types of local initiatives for the provision of social 
protection. Their 'internal' transition (transformation) allows them to be open to 
co-operation, and prepared to implement projects in every sector together with 
other organisations. They should also be enabled to undertake project 
management, and to prepare and implement their own projects financed by 
international organisations and other donors. The main co-operator of the 
Centres in the 'network' of various forms of social protection activities should be, 
crucially, local NGOs." (Papic, 1998; 258). 
  
The project in Phase I will have operated for two years with a total budget of some 4m. 
DEM, combining social welfare reform, the establishment of new Municipal Social Welfare 
Management Boards, capacity building; strengthening of physical and human resources; seed 
money for special focus projects with involvement of local NGOs; and training and research 
components. One key aim of the project is to increase the capacity of local people to plan and 
prioritise in situations when measures need to be taken even though resources are limited.   
The project represents a shift in the balance of power from international to local 
personnel and institutions, although the sheer number of discrete tasks, and complex 
management arrangements, mitigate against a wider strategic intervention.  In addition, the 
difficulty of supporting existing social protection practices whilst encouraging new partnerships, 
can lead to a relative neglect of community-based approaches and user involvement. There is 
also a real problem about how to link micro-level changes with a still relatively weak, macro-
level reform agenda. In addition, whilst UNDP globally and regionally have been important in 
challenging neo-liberal agendas in favour of a more balanced, human development oriented 
approach, the office in B-H has had considerable problems in responding strategically in the 
midst of a need to operate a wide range of diverse and disparate projects and programmes. 
The project certainly raised the profile of IBHI which has become recognised as a major social 
policy resource but, again, how far this is based on clear lines of accountability and structures is 
complex, and could be seen as an example of a shift in the balance of power away from 
academia and government towards private advice and implementation agencies.   
The shift to welfare governance at all levels is even more explicit in DFID’s ambitious 
four-year, 9 m DEM, programme explicitly seeking to connect different levels of the social 
welfare regime through an explicit focus on partnerships to reduce poverty, inequality and social 
exclusion.  It aims to influence structural relationships at three levels: the macro-level in terms of 
entity systems; the meso-level in terms of municipal social policy management and service 
delivery; and the micro-level in terms of community action projects and partnerships between 
municipalities and civil society actors. The programme will be implemented in four municipalities 
and is currently being tendered for by UK-registered private consultancy and training consortia. 
This move to private contractors, who must put together the best possible team, whilst 
combined with ownership in terms of a key DFID appointment, and a local reference group, is 
certainly an advance on programming through INGOs, but has perhaps not been explained 
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sufficiently in-country, and risks a further privatisation, and therefore arbitrariness, of the 
steering of welfare governance.   
What is particularly interesting in the DFID programme is the extensive assessment and 
consultation process, with an initial 45-day Scoping Mission (undertaken by the author of this 
chapter) and a 23-day Project Planning Mission undertaken by a team of three, including 
participatory project planning workshops in the pilot municipalities. A number of problematic 
issues remain, notably the failure to utilise Bosnian personnel as experts in what was a 
relatively expensive programme planning process and, secondly, the lack of wider public 
availability, and therefore ability to challenge, the reports. There are indications that both the 
Governments of Finland and Britain may be able to take the lead in initiating best practices, not 
only in terms of the content of programmes designed but, perhaps even more importantly, the 
process of programme design.    
 
 
7. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This chapter has sought to address something of the complexity of social sector reform 
in B-H and, whilst critical of international assistance efforts, has sought to go beyond a crude 
caricature of these interventions fostering a ‘dependency culture’. In a sense, the interactions 
between existing and new actors in a welfare regime which is local, entity-based, regional and 
global, are so complex that they can be misread as only structural or only inter-personal when, 
in fact, they are both.  In addition, the complex legacy of pre-war structures and cultures, and 
the memories of those, within individuals and institutions, is crucial. Perhaps most importantly, 
the inability of a technical project-based culture to deal with the most important inter-
connections between social, political and economic questions, in a society in which local 
conditions absorb and adapt initiatives to further clientelistic ends, is a key message.   
In this complexity, there are no clear agendas about what should be done, although a 
combination of three key issues can be put forward as tentative recommendations.  
 
7.1.  Promote genuine local capacity, expertise and analyses. The main message of this 
chapter has been the failure to utilise local expertise in ways which genuinely and 
fundamentally transform local-international power relationships in international assistance. This 
should involve commissioning Bosnian experts to analyse existing institutional structures and 
recommend how these can be strengthened and built upon; to take part in programme 
assessment and design missions; and in programme and sector-wide evaluations and lessons 
learnt studies. This would need to be combined with structures for dissemination and ensuring 
that these initiatives were understood and recognised by international agencies. In a sense, the 
establishment of a strong action-research oriented Social Policy Institute, with core funding for 5 
years, allowing any short-term project funds to be seen as additional and not, themselves, the 
core, would be of immense importance.   
 
7.2.  Develop transparent structures which are explicit about the value base of interventions 
and which strive for value consensus in social policy. This is even more complex and difficult, 
going beyond the often-stated need for improved co-ordination, to respect the need for new 
kinds of dialogue about the difference between a (primarily European) social rights position 
recognising the human dimension of social policy challenging poverty, inequality and social 
exclusion and a (primarily United States) neo-liberal position which focuses on economic 
growth.  In a sense, whilst ‘Bosnians must determine their own social policy’, the importance of 
international transfers are such that wider debates here are rarely held, with key agencies such 
as the Open Society Institute absent from the debates completely.  In addition, explicitness 
about the need to challenge clientelistic relationships needs to be made much stronger.   
 
7.3.   Create funding structures which are longer-term and which build partnerships and trust. 
There is a need to recognise that, in the context of the global social system, B-H is not 
particularly poor and that high levels of external assistance have been predominantly based on 
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its geo-political significance and the importance of promoting Western expertise and interests, 
rather than based on needs.  Promoting partnerships should involve flexible co-financing by 
external and internal sources, and promoting genuine links between governmental, civil society, 
and grassroots actors.  Only then can a new social policy which itself builds peace and social 
justice be implemented.   
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